General William E. Odom makes a trenchant comment on the 9/11 commission recommendations:
" No organizational design will compensate for incompetent incumbents, but some designs prevent competent incumbents from performing well. The 9/11 commission's design for a new national intelligence director (NID) is sure to accomplish the latter."
I had the opportunity of completing a major portion of a document known as the Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP) for General Odom. I'm proud to say that, in the late 1980's, intelligence analysts in the Army, Air Force, and DIA were able to write candidly about the weakness of Soviet industry and science. Our Colonel would give careful scrutiny to opinions that challenged the prevailing mindset about the Soviet threat. If he found them sound, approve their publication in appropriate intelligence documents.
In this regard, Odom relates an instructive story:
" In late 1944, as the German Wehrmacht prepared to launch its last counteroffensive at the Battle of the Bulge, several pieces of intelligence suggested it was coming. The top American generals couldn't agree on the value of the intelligence. Montgomery and his obedient intelligence officer (known as his G-2) stubbornly rejected the facts; Bradley and his G-2 remained skeptical and passive. Eisenhower and his G-2 were somewhat quicker to sense the danger but slower than Patton, whose G-2 saw it coming several weeks beforehand, prompting Patton to get his divisions ready to meet the offensive.
So four commanders with essentially the same intelligence turned in different performances. Though slightly disadvantaged by being at a lower echelon than all the others, Patton was far ahead of them in his appreciation of the impending assault.
In writing up this case study, Harold Deutsch, a military historian in World War II, showed how the personalities of these commanders intimidated their G-2s, discouraging them from emphasizing unpleasant findings or pursuing other lines of analysis. In his words, "Whether the commanding general was on the correct or wrong track, therefore, the G-2 was likely to be right there with him. Perhaps the fine performance of Gustave Koch [Patton's G-2] was largely due to being lucky in his boss."
Now we read about another F.B.I. agent who might have penetrated an overseas Islamic terrorist network but was prevented by the F.B.I. headquarters.
Just as in the case of the Columbia Shuttle disaster, institutional culture is a major part of the problem. To the extent that it ignores leadership and cultural issues, the debate over placement of the new Director of National Intelligence will miss the point.
Just for interest, I am the "poor SOB" who dreamt up the Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP) in 1979 and suffered through two years of abuse by General Odom's predecessors and their staffs before I was given the opportunity to brief him on it (led by BG Morelli and COL Lundgren - both of ODCSDOC at TRADOC in 1981).
Posted by: Jim MacGregor | July 13, 2005 at 12:33 PM