Howard Kurtz , in WaPo for August 12 investigates the reasons for missing the story on WMD. The Post did print some stories casting doubt on the case for WMD. For example:
"Despite the Bush administration's claims" about WMDs, the March 16 Pincus story began, "U.S. intelligence agencies have been unable to give Congress or the Pentagon specific information about the amounts of banned weapons or where they are hidden, according to administration officials and members of Congress," raising questions "about whether administration officials have exaggerated intelligence."
However, by its own admission, the Post seriously underplayed news challenging the reigning paradigm of an immanent Iraqi WMD threat.
The problems facing the WaPo and the NYT were similar those faced in the intelligence community – and in any other large organization.
Kurtz writes that Walter Pincus was filing stories challenging the case for WMD. The stories were, however, tentative, conjectural and, because of the nature of material, difficult to edit. Stories like this tend to get buried on the inside of the newspaper.
When I wrote about 9/11 I wrote that The life of a warning officer is tough, especially when the evidence is tentative and challenges the existing paradigm. Stories about Pearl Harbor and the Battle of the Bulge make this clear. Of necessity, warnings are always based on incomplete evidence. To be successful, a warning must meet the following conditions:
• The officer must be convinced that the warning is valid.
• The officer must be convincing in manner and substance when delivering the warning.
• The warning must be timely
• The Chief Executive must be convinced that the warning is valid.
From Kurtz’s explanation, WaPo reporter Walter Pincus was not convinced, nor could he be convincing in his doubts. He was writing stories that challenged the existing mindset – always hard.
As David Kay has explained – adequately in my opinion – there were a number of reasons that the intelligence community reached the wrong assessment. I have argued – and did in a pre-war letter to my Senators and Representative- that, if we had looked carefully at the pathetic state of Iraqi readiness and training, we would have suspected that the military threat was minimal. Even that, however, would have been unconvincing and would not have eliminated the possibility of a WMD attack inside the US by a terrorist group in contact with Saddam.
Kurtz asks if a tougher stance by the WaPo might have slowed the rush to war. Given the weakness of a case that could have been made by even the most perceptive intelligence analyst working on the inside, I doubt it.
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