NYT reporter Douglas Jehl reports that the Bush team was warned about intelligence doubts on the threat from Al Qaeda and Iraqi WMD’s.
It seems clear that there were members of the intelligence community who surfaced doubts about the reliability of intelligence reports. Much of Jehl’s report has been discussed in the MSM, notably the WaPo and NYT and four times in this blog. (Most recently here .)
Jehl writes that a document identified as DITSUM 044-02 said that
it was probable that the prisoner, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, “was intentionally misleading the debriefers’’ in making claims about Iraqi support for Al Qaeda’s work with illicit weapons
…
In outlining reasons for its skepticism, the D.I.A. report noted that Mr. Libi’s claims lacked specific details about the Iraqis involved, the illicit weapons used and the location where the training was to have taken place.
“It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers,’’ the February 2002 report said. “Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest.’’DITSUM would appear to be the acronym for Defense Intelligence Terrorist Summary. The number indicates that it is the 44th document issued in 2002. Since the number is “044” – a three digit sequence, one can assume that the document was circulated in mid-February of 2002, assuming that there was one DITSUM each day.
The problem for the Senate in investigating prewar intelligence is captured by an old Virginia proverb: “Hindsight is better than foresight by a darn sight.” For every major intelligence failure, historians can find a document which, properly read and appreciated, would have prevented the failure. This includes Pearl Harbor and the Battle of the Bulge.
The challenge is to correctly evaluate discrepant information at the time. This information is usually fragmentary and insufficient. The challenge of interpreting new and differing information is captured in this old story<
Old hands may recall the fictional story of a British warnings officer who retired in 1950. His last task was to train a young, still wet-behind-the -ears-analyst. “Son,” he said, “when I was young and inexperienced, I often received messages saying that the Germans were ready to attack and I should awaken the Prime Minister. Every time, I examined the reports, found them unconvincing, and did not pass the warning to him. I’m proud to say that I was only wrong twice.”Warning officers soon learn Fiedler’s second law of forecasting: "those who live by the crystal ball soon learn to eat ground glass.”
Of necessity, warnings are always based on incomplete evidence. To be successful, a warning must meet the following conditions:_
• The officer must be convinced that the warning is valid.
• The officer must be convincing in manner and substance when delivering the warning.
• The warning must be timely
• The Chief Executive must be convinced that the warning is valid.
If these four conditions had been met, intelligence officials might have headed warnings from lower levels and refrained from telling the President that the for the Iraqi threat was a “slam dunk”.
In short, while we can find reports from mid-level officials that cast doubt on the prevailing mindset that Saddam was an immediate threat, it would have been very difficult for them to cast doubt on the WMD threat. Even if they had, there was still a case for going to war based on the nature and long term threat of the regime.
The NYT wants to prove that the administration use of prewar intelligence was faulty. They would, no doubt, like to prove that it was deliberate. I’ve contended that the failures were, in part, due to poor analysis. It seems clear to me that there was a mindset on the part of top level intelligence and policy officials and that this mindset contributed to the decision to go to war. I’m not willing, however, to say that this mindset was deliberate and that the administration deliberately deceived the public into supporting the war. It was close. Had top-level officials been more thorough and conscientious, they might have spotted the deceptions.
A Senate investigation could clarify the matter – if it doesn’t get buried in political finger pointing.
Linked to Beltway Sunday Drive
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