Richard Clarke, former terrorism advisor to the Bush administration has provoked a controversy with his new book. While the controversy rages about whether the administration ignored warnings, there are a three points to keep in mind.
First, retired intelligence analysts have a very natural temptation to issue a plaintive cry of “I warned them but they didn’t pay attention to me.” (“Poor me.”)
Second, warnings are almost always ambiguous. The warning officer’s dilemma is best illustrated by the old story of a British warnings officer who retired in 1950. His last task was to train a young, still wet-behind –ears-analyst. “Son, “ he said, “when I was young and inexperienced, I often received messages saying that the Germans were ready to attack and I should awaken the Prime Minister. Every time, I examined the reports, found them unconvincing, and did not pass the warning to the Prime minister. I’m proud to say that I was only wrong twice.” Of necessity, warnings are always based on incomplete evidence. This brings us to the third point.
In most cases, (Pearl Harbor, 9/11, and the end of the cold war), a historians will be able to show that adequate information was available. However, the mindset of analysts and decision makers prevented them from correctly perceiving the information. An incorrect mindset can lead to failure to act in time (Pearl Harbor). It can also lead to a premature action (the danger of an even a partially successful Iraqi WMD program justified a pre-emptive attack).
The critics are now quick to say that the Bush and Clinton administrations failed to anticipate 9/11. They can serve the country by investigating the causes of failure. They would do well to remember an old Virginia proverb: “Hindsight is better than foresight by a darn-sight.”
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