I plan to write some reflections about Iraq, preemptive attack, intelligence failures, the just war doctrine and the Weinberger criteria. This will take some time, since I need to digest the 9/11 report and the WMD report. As background, here is a comparison of the Just War and Weinberger doctrine. I got this published in the April 1991 issue of Army magazine. The article developed from my final Army War College paper and was supposed to be the Front and Center column about how the Army prepared for future conflict. It still holds up fairly well after 14 years. Please take a look. (Note this is a long paper by blogging standards – 2300 words.
America's Political Fault Lines'
Undermine Weinberger Doctrine
By Herbert P. Ely
We the People of the United States,
in order to form a more perfect Union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote
the general welfare and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.
Preamble of the Constitution of the United States
There is a fundamental link between constitutional values and good strategy. This link has now been obscured by the controversy over the future mission of the Army and the changing fabric of American political culture. This obscuration should be removed and the link clarified before a situation arises that requires resorting to force.
The Constitution establishes a relationship among the government, the Army and the people. Karl von Clausewitz identified these three entities as the 'remarkable trinity' of war. A correct relationship among them is essential for strategic victory. This relationship can be broken if the Army is committed without the support of the people; or if that support is lost and the Army is separated from the people and government, strategic defeat will overshadow tactical victories. This is the hard lesson learned from Vietnam, according to Col. Harry G. Summers Jr. in On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1981).
To avoid a repetition of this costly and painful experience. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger set forth some conditions for the use of force. If met, these conditions should serve to preserve the proper relationship among the government, the Army and the people.
The Weinberger conditions focus on the political judgments associated with the use of force, yet the tradition of civilian control over the military is so strong that many officers resist the inclusion of political considerations in the education of senior leaders. For officers to ignore political considerations is to ignore the fundamental importance of the Clausewitzian trinity. Some planners emphasize that strategists cannot plan in isolation; they must be aware of the political culture of the American people.
Herein lies a fundamental strategic issue facing the Army. There are fault lines in our political culture that could lead us to find the Weinberger doctrine and the lessons of Vietnam true but inapplicable.
The language of individual rights has permeated our political culture in ways that obscure the integrating purposes stated in the preamble to our Constitution. Thus, the Army is presented with a fundamental long-range challenge: while sound strategy must be rooted in the common values stated by our founding fathers, public political discourse increasingly fails to include them.
At the same time, the Army must change its vision of its purpose as a result of the demise of the Warsaw Pact. This vision was recently described as a "myth"—not in the sense of something that is untrue, but in the sense of an organizing story that gives purpose to the Army and shapes both doc¬trine and force structure, says Lt. Col. A. J. Bacevich in "Old Myths, New Myths: Renewing American Military Thought" (Parameters, March 1988). The old myth—that the Army exists to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe and to defend if deterrence fails—no longer serves this purpose. A new myth is required if the Army is to be properly prepared for the future. It is essential that this myth be stated correctly. Col. Bacevich has suggested three candidate myths as replacements:
• The Army exists to fight rather than to deter.
• The fight will occur on the periphery, not in Europe. Forces in being will conduct the fight
• The fight will be in small wars where moral certitude may be in short supply."
Properly applied, the Weinberger doctrine would work within our political culture in precisely this kind of situation. Although not based on the just war theory, the Weinberger doctrine appears congruent with it. The Weinberger conditions are:
• The commission of forces to combat must support a vital interest of the United States or its allies.
• Sufficient troops should be committed to win.
• Political and military objectives should be clearly defined.
• The relationship between ends and means should be continually reassessed.
• Reasonable assurance of public support should be obtained.
• Force should be used only as a last resort.
Where Weinberger insists that we commit forces only in support of a vital interest, the just war doctrine insists on a just cause. These are not the same concept, but just war advocates are unlikely to accept the use of force for any interest less than vital.
There are fault lines in our political culture that could lead us to find the Weinberger doctrine and the lessons of Vietnam true but inapplicable. Just war advocates are likely to be restrictive in their definition of what actually is vital interest. Where Weinberger calls for committing forces necessary to win, just war advocates insist that war not be undertaken unless there is some probability of success. It is wrong to commit troops to battle without the intent to win and some chance of doing so. While winning does not necessarily mean the destruction of opposing forces, it does require the achievement of political and military objectives that are dearly defined.In addition to the military necessity of clearly defined objectives, just war advocates would certainly agree it is manifestly unjust for the government to commit troops to battle for ill-defined purposes.
Second, they are likely to insist on clear definitions to better assess the justness of a cause. Weinberger insists on reasonable assurance that forces committed abroad will have the support of Congress, and the just war doctrine holds that a war should be fought only when it is declared by a competent authority.
In our political system, competent authority would seem to be restricted to Congress by the Constitution, giving Congress alone the power to declare war—yet since this has proved unsatisfactory, the issue is now addressed (or obfuscated) by the War Powers Resolution. Imperfect though it Is, the resolution at least offers the possibility of explicit and defined relationships among the Army, the government and the people. It also offers the opportunity for the government to state clearly the objectives upon which strategic victory will depend.
Both Weinberger and just war advocates agree that force should be used as a last resort; thus part of the strength of the Weinberger doctrine derives from its congruence with the just war theory and its potential for strengthening the links between the Army, the government and the people.
Our political culture, however, has fault lines so deep that Weinberger's conditions may never be met. These fault lines are buried deep within the language our culture uses to describe fundamental concepts such as justice. Philosophers, sociologists and novelists have detected these fault lines. Philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre has argued that our contemporary ethical debate is in hopeless disorder (After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). While participants in the political process debate which actions are just or reasonable, they fail to realize that they are using terms bereft of the traditions that impart meaning to the concepts. The political debate, therefore, cannot come to closure over the justice of a contemplated governmental act.
In a similar argument, sociologist Daniel Bell finds a breakdown in social authority of the nations political process. He describes our current process as interest group pluralism (in 'The Crisis of Authority," New Perspective Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3,1988). Political discourse is viewed as an ongoing debate between rights-oriented egalitarian liberals and rights-oriented libertarian conservatives. Each side views the government as responsible for supporting the rights of individuals. Neither side relates its concept of rights to a vision of community. Without such a vision of community, the debate can come to closure only when one interest group gains control.
The trend toward interest group pluralism is reinforced by a rise of individualism and a loss of commitment to common values. Sociologist Robert N. Bellah and colleagues report in Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (University of California Press, 1985) that many individuals experience difficulty in finding language to relate concepts of self-reliance to larger purposes of family or community. Their vocabulary fails them as they try to relate concepts of selfless service to the good of the community.
Sociologist Alan Wolfe provides an extensive analysis of the breakdown of the notion of civil society in his book Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation (University of California Press, 1989). We all realize, he writes, that individuals achieve freedom and economic progress through a network of societal obligations and inter-dependencies. We disagree, however, not only on the moral rules for defining these obligations but even on where they can be found. Consequently, we depend either on the power of the government (typically a liberal position) or the power of the market (typically libertarian conservative) to enforce these obligations. Both positions are in some way unsatisfactory. The notion of civil society is too obscure and undefined to help in achieving consensus.
Novelists have found their own expressions of these issues. In The Thanatos Syndrome (Farrar, Straus & Giroux Inc., 1987), novelist Walker Percy shows how the language of modem governmental social scientists allows them to reduce antisocial and criminal behavior (that is, to ensure domestic tranquility) by secretly introducing a drug into the water supply of a Louisiana parish. Since this action seems entirely just to governmental decision makers, Mr. Percy suggests that our language is obscuring some basic concepts of justice.
A television series by Bill Moyers has suggested that televised images now dominate words in political campaigns, preventing public debate about the issues involved.
Novelist Tom Wolfe, in an address at the U.S. Military Academy, contrasts the Army ethic of selfless service with an age of 'Everyman the Aristocrat' ("The Meaning of Freedom," Parameters. March 1988). Driven by an expansive notion of freedom, every man and woman can expect a seat at the bacchanalian feast, exercising the right to the pursuit of happiness. The soldier maintains a sentinel-at the city gate, defending a different and more traditional notion of freedom.
From several points of view, our culture has problems with some fundamental political concepts. Therefore, it is hard to see how the political process can reach a conclusion and support a specific action directed toward constitutional values of a "more perfect union," establishing justice or promoting the general welfare.
In a culture dominated by interest group pluralism and dedicated to the cult of individualism, the phrases 'vital national interest' and 'just cause' lose much of their meaning. As the concept of community declines, public willingness to support a military, much less serve in it, will continue to decline. Army recruiting campaigns recognize this by appealing to market motivations-stressing ROTC as an opportunity for enhancing civilian career prospects as well as patriotic service.
If the Army now finds itself committed to a small war on the periphery, American political culture may not provide support and consensus on the issues necessary for the Weinberger conditions to be met. Vietnam's lessons will be both true and inapplicable.
Given the difficulties our political culture presents to the government in defining clear political objectives prior to starting a war, how should the U.S. Army meet the challenge?
• First, we must accept the improbability of a political consensus forming that will support an extended buildup. This means that existing forces must be ready and able to accomplish missions quickly. Quick success obviates the need for long-term public support.
• Second, senior leaders must insist on clear political objectives at the start of any operation and must use the War Powers Resolution as a means of gaining the support envisioned as necessary by the Weinberger doctrine. The requirements of the resolution also provide an opportunity for the government to gain support with its statement of objectives.
• Third, civil action must be an early and effective part of any campaign. If the U.S. forces cause undue collateral damage, their actions will undermine any claim to a just cause. It was not by accident that the action in Panama was called "Operation Just Cause."
• Fourth, quick success will depend on strategic mobility and joint operations. Both must be addressed and practiced in peace time.
• Last, the Army must take its fundamental manual. Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army), seriously.
This manual-with its emphasis on a constitutional basis for the role of the military in support of national purposes and on individual ethics-must be taught at all levels of command. Soldiers, officers and Army civilians must know that we are supporting common constitutional values and that there is a fundamental link between these values and sound strategy. They must adhere to constitutional and ethical values.
With these, the Army has a claim to support on the part of the public. This support, as we learned in Vietnam, is necessary to turn tactical into strategic victories.
HERBERT P. ELY is a career Department of the Army civilian in the Foreign Science and Technology Center. Mr. Ely is a graduate of the Army War College.
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